Protecting the Handicapped from Employment Discrimination: The Job-Relatedness and Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Doctrines by Lang, Jonathan
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 27 
Issue 4 Summer 1978: Symposium - 
Employment Rights of the Handicapped 
Article 4 
Protecting the Handicapped from Employment Discrimination: 
The Job-Relatedness and Bona Fide Occupational Qualification 
Doctrines 
Jonathan Lang 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Jonathan Lang, Protecting the Handicapped from Employment Discrimination: The Job-Relatedness and 
Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Doctrines, 27 DePaul L. Rev. 989 (1978) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol27/iss4/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
PROTECTING THE HANDICAPPED
FROM EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION:
THE JOB-RELATEDNESS AND BONA FIDE
OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION DOCTRINES
Jonathan Lang*
The rights of the handicapped to equal employment opportunity
guaranteed by federal and state statutes and constitutional provi-
sions still stand in need of proper implementation by the courts
and administrative agencies. Such implementation requires the
formulation of specific standards which will assist in distinguishing
between discriminatory and justifiable employment rejections as a
result of a handicap. The author suggests that two such standards,
the job-relatedness and bona fide occupational qualification doc-
trines used in Title VII Civil Rights adjudications, can be, with
careful modification, appropriately applied to employment cases
involving discrimination against the handicapped.
Rights of the handicapped to equal employment opportunity have
only recently been established by statutes and enunciated by the
courts.1 Translation of these new rights into effective remedies is the
next logical step, a step which must be taken for the most part by the
courts, and in some instances, by administrative agencies. Along the
way, some notions implicit in handicap discrimination law, not expli-
cated by the legislators, need to be clarified. In particular, two issues
must be resolved. The first is the extent and the manner in which
employers must show job-relatedness or validity of employment selec-
tion criteria that disproportionately exclude the handicapped. The
second, related to the first, is the scope of the bona fide occupational
qualification ("BFOQ") exception which may be used to justify prac-
tices that expressly exclude the handicapped.
The most analogous statute available for guidance, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2 prohibits discrimination in employment
based upon race, color, religion, sex and national origin but not, un-
* Associate Tufo, Johnston, Zuccotti & Allegaert; formerly Staff Attorney, National
Employment Law Project, Inc.; Member, State Bar of New York; A.B., Columbia University;
J.D. Fordham University Law School.
1. For recent developments, see generally, Employment Rights of the Handicapped, 11
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 703 (Dec. 1977). For a discussion of the relevant statutes and other
provisions see notes 8-28 infra.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. V 1975).
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fortunately, handicap.3 Under Title VII, selection criteria that oper-
ate to exclude a disproportionate number of the protected class are
justifiable only by a showing of job-relatedness or validity. 4
Moreover, religion, sex or national origin may be used as criteria in
and of themselves only if justified as a BFOQ "reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of [the] . . .particular business or enter-
prise." 5
The notion of job-relatedness is thus distinguished from that of the
BFOQ in that the former comes into play when selection criteria that
are neutral on their face nevertheless operate to exclude members of
certain groups, while the latter serves as a justification for the overt
exclusion of these groups. Each doctrine occupies a separate and
integral part of employment discrimination law under Title VII; both
act in practice as limitations on the protected applicant's or
employee's rights under the statute. It is important, therefore, that
these limitations be read carefully, with the interests of the persons
that Congress sought to protect in mind. In the area of Title VII this
has been done to a great extent; the burden of showing job-
relatedness and BFOQ has been placed upon the user of the criteria
in question. 6
In facing the task of shaping the legal rights and remedies of the
han'dicapped, the courts today are in a position not dissimilar from
that occupied by the courts construing Title VII in the late 1960's.
The unexplained intentions of the legislature must be given meaning,
this time in the special context of the handicapped employee or
applicant for employment.
The judicial interpretations of Title VII on the issues of job-re-
latedness and BFOQ lend themselves to application in the handicap
field. In this regard, the substantive rights under the statutes and
constitutional provisions protecting the handicapped from employ-
ment discrimination will be discussed briefly as they bear upon or
subsume the job-relatedness and BFOQ doctrines. Then the applica-
3. Amendments have been proposed which would make Title VII applicable to discrimina-
tion based upon handicap. H.R. 10198, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. H12,613 (daily
ed. Dec. 1, 1977) (remarks of Rep. O'Brien). H.R. 9477, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REG.
H10,739 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1977) '(remarks of Rep. O'Brien). However, to date, these amend-
ments have not been passed into law.
4. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
5. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (Supp. 1975); see Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). The BFOQ exception is to be construed narrowly. See notes
82-98 and accompanying text infra.
6. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-31 (1977) (BFOQ); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (job-relatedness).
[Vol. 27:989
JOB-RELATEDNESS & BFOQ'S
tions of these two doctrines in recent handicap cases will be treated
and compared with the current state of Title VII law. Finally, an
argument for applying the Title VII standards of job-relatedness and
BFOQ to the handicap cases will be made.
THE JOB-RELATEDNESS AND BFOQ DOCTRINES
AS PART OF THE STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS PROTECTING THE HANDICAPPED.
Protection from employment discrimination against the handicapped is
guaranteed by federal statutes, United States constitutional provi-
sions, and state statutes. 7  Foremost among the federal statutes is the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 8 but also of importance are the non-
discrimination provisions of the Fiscal Assistance to State and Local
Governments ("Revenue Sharing") Act of 19729 and the federal Civil
Service Act. 10 To date, all of the federal statutes are applicable only
to employment with agencies, grantees or contractors of the federal
government. Of the federal constitutional remedies available to the
handicapped, due process in the form of the irrebuttable presumption
doctrine has proven to be the most effective, " although some cases
have been based upon equal protection. 12  C)verage under either
constitutional provision is limited, of course, to public employment or
employment in which requisite governmental action is present.
At the state and local level, at least 36 states, as well as the District
of Columbia and New York City, have some type of provision 13 pro-
hibiting to some degree 14 employment discrimination against the
handicapped. All of these federal, state and local statutes and provi-
sions subsume, to varying degrees, the doctrines of job-relatedness
and BFOQ, and the potential limitation on discriminatees' rights that
7. See generally, Employment Rights of the Handicapped, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 703
(Dec. 1977).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp. V 1975).
9. 31 U.S.C. § 1242 (a) (1) (Supp. 1978).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 7153 (Supp. V 1975).
11. See, e.g., Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., 558 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977); Gurman-
kin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977); Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75 (1977);
Cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LeFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (mandatory maternity leave policy
violates due process).
12. Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., 558 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977). Equal protection
cases are now made more difficult to prove by the Supreme Court's requirement that dis-
criminatory animus be shown. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Beazer was decided
in the district court prior to Washington, and equal protection was one of the grounds relied
upon. See 399 F. Supp. 1032, 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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are concomitant with them. For example, Section 504 of the Federal
Rehabilitation Act provides:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United
States, as defined in section 706(6) of this title, shall, solely by
reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 15
Regulations promulgated by the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare ("HEW")16 have defined the term "qualified handi-
capped 17 person":
(1) with respect to employment, a handicapped person who, with
reasonable accomodation, can perform the essential functions of the
job in question .... 18
The HEW regulations go on to incorporate directly the requirement
of job-relatedness.' 9 However, a handicapped person must at least
be able to perform the essential functions of the job in question20 in
order to be protected under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
Thus, criteria that purport to test for or indicate this ability are per-
missible, even if the criteria exclude handicapped individuals.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975).
16. 45 C.F.R. § 84 (1977).
17. For the purpose of employment discrimination, the Act defines "handicapped indi-
vidual" as:
any person who (A) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits
one or more of such person's major life activities, (B) or a record of such an impair-
ment, or (C) is regarded as having such an impairment.
29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (Supp. V 1975).
The HEW regulations further define the terms used in 29 U.S.C. § 706(6), such as "physical
and mental impairment," and "major life activities." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(1977).
18. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1) (1977) (emphasis added).
19. 45 C.F.R. § 84.13 (1977) provides:
(a) A recipient may not make use of any employment test or other selection
criterion that screens out or tends to screen out handicapped persons or any class of
handicapped persons unless: (1) the test score or other selection criterion, as used
by the recipient, is shown to be job-related for the position in question, and (2)
alternative job-related tests or criteria that do not screen out or tend to screen out
as many handicapped persons are not shown by the Director to be available.
(b) A recipient shall select and administer tests concerning employment so as best
to ensure that, when administered to an applicant or employee who has a handicap
that impairs sensory, manual, or speaking skills, the test results accurately reflect
the applicant's or employee's job skills, aptitude, or whatever other factor the test
purports to measure, rather than reflecting the applicant's or employee's impaired
sensory, manual, or speaking skills (except where those skills are the factors that the
test purports to measure).
20. Subject, of course, to the employer's duty under the Act to accommodate the
employee's handicap.
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Similarly, job-relatedness plays an important role in the context of
federal constitutional litigation. When equal protection violations are
alleged, the standard defenses are showings of rational basis and
legitimate or compelling state interests. 21 In the face of allegations
that due process has been violated, defendants may assert that the
challenged procedures or criteria are not arbitrary or "utterly lacking
in rational justification." 22  In either event, the basis of the defense
rests upon a showing that the criteria used are somehow reasonably
related to performance on the job in question.23
Finally, almost all of the relevant state legislation also subsumes
the notion of job-relatedness and/or BFOQ. For example the New
York statute 24 provides that:
in all provisions... dealing with employment, the term (disability)
shall be limited to physical, mental or medical conditions which
are unrelated to the ability to engage in the activities involved in
the job or occupation which a person claiming protection of this
article shall be seeking. 25
New York's treatment of this issue is typical of most state laws. The
various state laws differ, however, in that some speak in terms of
job-relatedness, 26 others in terms of BFOQ, 27 and still others in am-
biguous terms. 28  All, however, incorporate the concept that physical
criteria bearing a relationship to the job in question are not prohi-
bited.
21. See, e.g., Gilnore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974); Fortin v. Darlington
Little League Inc., 514 F.2d 344 (1st Cir. 1975); Neeld v. American Hockey League, 453 F.
Supp. 466 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
22. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960); accord, Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S.
749 (1975). But cf., Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184, 187 n.5 (3d Cir. 1977) discussed in
text accompanying notes 37-39 infra.
23. For example, in Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977), the district court
below had noted that "the school district's apparent goal of insuring that only competent
teachers are hired is proper and legitimate," 411 F. Supp. 982, 990 (E.D. Pa. 1976), but held
that the total exclusion of blind applicants from consideration was not justified in view of more
reasonable ways to determine competence. Id. at 991-92.
24. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1975).
25. Id. § 292.21 (emphasis added).
26. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-801 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 413.08 (West 1974); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4.1 (West 1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 64-304.
27. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-126; HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2 (1975); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 601A.6 (West 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01-.13 (1973); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.310-430
(1971); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354A:8.
28. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48 § 853 (Smith-Hurd 1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 4572




Thus, in any forum in which the handicapped litigant finds himself,
be it a federal court, a state court or an administrative agency, he will
have to deal with the issue of job-relatedness or BFOQ. The litigant
is therefore well advised, in the first instance, to be familiar with the
treatment these issues have received in the few handicap cases that
have been decided.
JOB-RELATEDNESS AND BFOQ
IN THE RECENT HANDICAP CASES.
The courts have only recently proven to be viable vehicles for re-
dressing the problems of the handicapped. Accordingly, unlike the
Title VII cases, in the absence of supportive judicial precedent, the
courts treating the job-relatedness and BFOQ issues in handicap
cases have applied individualized standards, based in large part upon
the conception of the particular judge.
A case in point is Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific R.R. v.
Washington State Human Rights Commission, 29 in which the trial
court was called upon to determine whether an employer was prohib-
ited from discriminating against an applicant who had had the medial
menisci cartilage removed from his knees. 30 The job in question was
that of brakeman. The bulk of the evidence considered by the court
appears to have been a film made by the defendant Railroad which
"showed in great detail the duties and dangers involved in the job of
railroad brakeman."31 Despite the fact that the Railroad's examining
physician had found no weakness or instability in the applicant's
knees, 32 the court concluded that "[a] person who has had medial
menisci removed from his knees cannot properly perform the job of
railroad brakeman." 33 Although medical testimony had been offered
by both sides, it was not discussed in detail. 34 This case exemplifies
the current lack of legal standards in the area of handicap discrimina-
tion litigation.
29. 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 854 (Wash. Super. Ct. 1975), affd in part, rev'd in part, and
remanded on other grounds, 87 Wash. 2d 802, 557 P.2d 307 (1976).
30. The claim was based upon the applicable Washington statute, WASH. REv. CODE §
49.60 (1973).
31. Chicago, Mil., St. P., & Pac. HR. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 11 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 854, 855 (Wash. Super. Ct. 1975).
32. Id. at 854.
33. Id. at 855.
34. The full discussion of the medical testimony was brief indeed:
The testimony of Dr. James F. Depree establishes that all or substantially all
[Vol. 27:989
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Other courts have conducted somewhat more studied inquiries into
the nature of a particular handicap and a particular job in order to
determine job-relatedness as an exclusionary criterion. For example,
in Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific R.R. v. Wisconsin De-
partment of Industry, Labor, and Human Relations, 35 an employee
was terminated from his job performing cleaning tasks in the defend-
ant's diesel house due to a history of asthma and a back problem. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the criteria for termination
were not shown by the defendant to be job-related:
On review of the record as a whole, there is no evidence that
Goodwin was unable to efficiently perform the duties of his job as a
common laborer. Goodwin performed without ill effects all of the
jobs assigned to him in the diesel house. In fact, there was no
medical testimony that, to a reasonable degree of medical cer-
tainty, that [sic] the working conditions were or would be hazard-
ous to his health.
In fact, the record as a whole reveals that the complainant was
physically qualified to efficiently perform the duties of his job as a
common laborer .... 36
Although obviously favorable from the handicapped worker's point of
view, this case, like the one discussed before it, shows only a cursory
effort on the part of the court to establish or follow any guidelines in
determining job-relatedness. Nor are more detailed analyses found in
the cases decided under the United States Constitution or the Re-
habilitation Act. For example, in Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 37 a blanket
exclusion of blind applicants from consideration as teachers of sighted
students was held to violate the Due Process Clause by imposing an
irrebuttable presumption that blind persons are incompetent to teach
sighted students.38 The Gurmankin court did not reach the issue of
the job-relatedness of the school district's selection criteria, beyond
holding that blindness per se should not be disqualifying. In fact, the
persons who have had medical meniscectomies on each knee cannot properly per-
form the job of railroad brakeman ...
Dr. John Nilan, an orthopedic surgeon, examined Robert G. Clark and testified
that Clark could do strenuous labor. Dr. Nilan knew nothing about the particular
demands of the job of brakeman other than what he might have seen on television.
Id.
35. 62 Wisc. 2d 392, 215 N.W. 2d 443 (1974).
36. Id. at 398-99, 215 N.W. 2d at 446. Cf. City of Wis. Rapids v. Wisconsin Dep't of
Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6227 (Cir. Ct. 1977) (discharge of
fireman because of heart murmur violates Wisconsin state statute).
37. 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977).
38. Id. at 186-88. Reliance was placed on Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LeFleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974), in which the Supreme Court had invalidated mandatory fixed maternity leave as viola-
tive of due process.
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court expressly left open the question of the validity of the other
selection criteria used by the school district:
In this case ... Gurmankin's complaint is not addressed to the re-
quirement that Philadelphia teachers pass a qualifying examination,
which she eventually passed, but rather to the pre-1974 denial of
the opportunity to demonstrate her competency.3 9
The irrebuttable presumption doctrine defers the question of job-
relatedness to another day, since the doctrine is. applied only when an
individual has been totally denied the opportunity to present evi-
dence of competence.4 0  However, some constitutional decisions
have inquired into the job-related merits of the case. In Duran v.
City of Tampa, 41 the plaintiff alleged that the principles of LeFleur
had been violated by the defendants' blanket refusal to hire as police
officers individuals who had suffered epilepsy. On motion by the
plaintiff for a preliminary injunction, the court concluded that there
was a substantial likelihood of success on the due process claim. 42  In
reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon the unrebutted expert
testimony of two doctors that the plaintiff had outgrown his epilepsy
39. Id. at 187. The court also noted: "This is not a case challenging the competency re-
quirements for teachers. It challenges the deprivation of the right to present evidence of com-
petency." Id. at 187 n.5.
40. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LeFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Vlandis v. Kline, 412
U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 646 (1972); Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184
(3d Cir. 1977); Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla. 1977); Cf. Weinberger v.
Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (irrebutable presumption attack rejected on duration-of-relationship re-
quirements of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416 (c) (5) and (e) (2)). In Gurmankin the
Third Circuit distinguished Weinberger in which the challenged social security provision disqual-
ified any person married to a decedent within nine months of the decedent's death from receipt
of surviving spouse (and stepchildren) benefits. Id. at 187 n.5. The court in Gurmankin
reasoned that in Weinberger the plaintiffs were at least able to present evidence that they met
the statutory requirements. By contrast, in Gurisankin the blind plaintiff, at least until 1974,
had not been allowed to present any evidence at all that she was competent to teach. This
distinction between Gurmankin and Weinberger may be more apparent than real. The pre-
sumption challenged in Weinberger was that persons marrying within the statutory time before
death had done so for the purpose of collecting surviving spouse benefits. In Gurmsankin the
presumption was that blind persons were incompetent to teach sighted students. Although it is
true that in Weinberger persons were free to present evidence that they married outside of the
proscripted period, the same might be said of the situation in Gurmankin, since applicants
probably would have been allowed to present evidence that they were able to see.
41. 430 F. Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
42. Id. at 78. Additionally, violation of the Rehabilitation Act had been alleged, and the
court found a substantial likelihood of success on that claim also. Id. The preliminary injunction
was denied, however, because the plaintiff did not show irreparable injury. 430 F. Supp. at 79.
See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974). The court noted, however, that "an almost im-
mediate trial of these issues is anticipated.'" Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. at 79.
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and was "perfectly able to serve from a medical perspective as a
policeman." 43
The cases discussed above, as well as others, 44 are indicative of the
manner in which the courts to date have approached the issues of
job-relatedness and BFOQ in the handicap discrimination cases. Es-
sentially, a common sense (or lack of it) 4 5 approach has been applied.
The reasons for exclusion of a particular handicapped person have
been considered, and if deemed reasonable, fair or legitimate, have
been upheld, 46 and if not, invalidated.4 7 Although there are merits
to this simplified approach, it is submitted that the well developed
set of standards, which has evolved under Title VII, will be instruc-
tive in formulating general principles of job-relatedness and BFOQ in
the handicap area.
TREATMENT OF THE ISSUES OF
JOB-RELATEDNESS AND BFOQ UNDER TITLE VII.
Under Title VII the notion of job-relatedness differs from that of
the BFOQ in that the former comes into play to justify criteria that
exclude a disproportionate number of a protected class, while the lat-
ter is used to justify the outright exclusion of a particular group. To
date, the handicap cases and applicable statutes are not in agreement
43. Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. at 76. The court also concluded from the expert
testimony that the chances of the plaintiff having a future seizure were "equal to that of any
person in the general population ..... Id. This observation may take the case out of the ambit
of handicap discrimination, since the court thereby found that the plaintiff was not at all hand-
icapped. Ironically, then, the presumption in Duran did not operate accurately to include the
handicapped applicants that it ostensibly was designed to include (i.e., epileptics).
44. See, e.g., Neeld v. American Hockey League, 439 F. Supp. 459 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); City
of Wis. Rapids v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 15 Empl. Prac. Dec.
6227 (Wis. Cir, Ct. 1977); Coleman v. Darden, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6788 (D. Colo. 1977);
Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 13 Empl. Prac.
Dec. 7078 (Wisc. Cir. Ct. 1977).
45. See e.g., Chicago, Mil., St. P. & Pac. R.R. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 11
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, 854 (Wash. Super. Ct. 1975), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded
on other grounds, 87 Wash. 2d 802, 557 P.2d 307 (1976); see also text accompanying notes 29-34
supra. In addition to the holding the Washington trial court held that a blind person could not
serve on the fact finding tribunal of the Human Rights Comm'n because she was unable to view
the film shown by the defendant railroad on the duties of a brakeman. 11 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas.
at 855. This exclusion was upheld on appeal, although for a different reason-bias-than that
posited by the lower court. 87 Wash. 2d 802, 557 P.2d 307 (1976).
46. See, e.g., Coleman v. Darden, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec, 6788 (D. Colo. 1977).
47. See, e.g., Chrysler Outboard Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human
Relations, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6883 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1976); Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't
of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7078 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1977); Fraser
Shipyards Inc. v. Department of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
1809 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1976).
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as to whether one or both of these standards should be applied, and if
so, in what instances. 48  By contrast, under Title VII a substantial
body of law has emerged dealing separately with the job-relatedness
and BFOQ doctrines and their applicability to particular situations.
Job-Relatedness
The seminal case on job-relatedness under Title VII is Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 49 in which the Supreme Court held that an
employer's use of written tests and a high school degree requirement
as employment criteria violated Title V11 50 because the criteria dis-
qualified a disproportionate number of blacks and because the criteria
were not shown to be related to job performance. The Court's
unanimous holding was summarized in the Chief Justice's opinion:
Congress has now provided that tests or criteria for employment
or promotion may not provide equality of opportunity merely in
the sense of the fabled offer of milk to the stork and the fox. .On
the contrary, Congress has now required that the posture and con-
dition of the job-seeker be taken into account .... The Act pro-
scribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair
in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is busi-
ness necessity. If an employment practice which operates to
exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job perfor-
mance, the practice is prohibited. 5 1
The Court in Griggs considered intent of the user of the criteria of no
legal significance in determining validity. 52 Only the consequences
48. Compare, Coleman v. Darden, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6788 (D. Colo. 1977) with
Neeld v. American Hockey League, 439 F. Supp. 459 (W. 1). N.Y. 1977). In Coleman the court
stated that denial by a federal agency of employment to a blind person as legal research assis-
tant because he required a reader did not amount to arbitrary or capricious action based on a
conclusion or irrebutable presumptions. The court maintained that sufficient visual acuity to
enable the employee to read had a direct relationship to the job of assisting lawyers. In Neeld,
the court said that under New York state law, "blindness is a disability against which an
employer may not discriminate unless sight in one or both eyes is shown to be a bona fide
occupational qualification." 439 F. Supp. at 462.
49. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
50. Griggs was decided tinder Section 703(a) of Title VII, which provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Supp. V 1975).
51. 401 U.S. at 431,
52. Id. at 432.
[Vol. 27:989
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of the employer's practices, not the motivation, are relevant.53 Fi-
nally, the Court held that the employer, not the aggrieved party, has
the burden of proving job-relatedness once the criteria are shown to
have disparate impact.54
Since Griggs, a number of lower court decisions, 55 and some Su-
preme Court decisions, 56 have applied its principles. In 1975, the
Supreme Court was called upon to explain the nature and extent of
the employer's obligation under Title VII to validate selection criteria
(i.e., show them to be job-related). In Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 57 written tests having disparate impact on blacks were again
challenged as violative of Title VII. However, unlike Griggs, where
the tests and high school requirement had been adopted without any
meaningful study, 58 the employer, in Moody, at least attempted to
defend its test with a professional study made by an industrial
psychologist. 59 This study was rejected by the Court, however,
which took the opportunity to further delineate the burden that must
be carried by an employer in showing job-relatedness. After noting
that "[t]he question of job-relatedness must be viewed in the context
of the plant's operation and the history of the testing program," 60 the
53. id.
54. Id. Accord McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Even if the
employer is able to show job-relatedness, the employee may still prevail if he then carries a
burden of showing that criteria without disparate effect would also serve the employer's interest
in "efficient and trustworthy workmanship." 411 U.S. at 801; accord Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
55. See e.g., United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 455-57 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir.
1973); Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded
for reconsideration of relief, 423 U.S. 809 (1975); Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 516
F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1975); League of Latin American Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp.
873 (C.D. Cal. 1976); United States v. Local 638, Enterprise Ass'n of Steamfitters, 360 F.Supp.
979 (S.D. N.Y. 1973), aff'd and modified, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974).
56. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405 (1975); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 93-95 (1973); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
57. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
58. 401 U.S. at 831. The Court in Griggs noted:
On the record before us, neither the high school completion requirement nor the
general intelligence test is shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to successful
performance of the jobs for which it was used. Both were adopted, as the Court of
Appeals noted, without meaningful study of their relationship to job-performance
ability. Rather, a vice president of the Company testified, the requirements were
instituted on the Company's judgment that they generally would improve the over-
all quality of the work force.
Id.
59. 422 U.S. at 429-30.
60. Id. at 427.
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Moody Court concluded that the validation study offered as a defense
was legally insufficient because it did not conform with the testing
guidelines published by the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission ("EEOC Guidelines"). 61
Promulgated primarily in recognition of the inherently racially dis-
criminatory nature of written tests, 62 the EEOC Guidelines require
the presentation of empirical data which demonstrate that a given
test 63 is predictive of or significantly correlated with important ele-
ments of work behavior. By the successful presentation of such data,
a test is "validated." 64 Before validation is required, however, the
Title VII plaintiff must make out a prima facie case of discrimination.
This is ordinarily done by showing that minority group applicants
61. 1d. at 430-31. The EEOC Guidelines are found at 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1977). They are not
"administrative regulations" in that they were not promulgated in accordance with the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 501-559, 701-703, 3105, 3344, 5371, 7521 (1976). In Griggs,
however, the Court had held that they were "[t]he administrative interpretation of the Act by
the enforcing agency," and accordingly, were "entitled to great deference." 401 U.S. at 433-34.
In Moody, the Court reaffrmed this principle, 422 U.S. at 431, although the Chief Justice, in
partial dissent, took issue with the Court's apparent view that "absolute compliance with the
EEOC Guidelines is a sine qua non of pre-employment test validation." Id. at 449.
62. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1(b) (1977).
63. The EEOC Guidelines define "test" broadly:
The term "test" includes all formal, scored, quantified or standardized techniques of
assessing job suitability including, in addition to the above, specific qualifying or
disqualifying personal history or background requirements, specific educational or
work history requirements, scored interviews, biographical information blanks, in-
terviewers' rating scales, scored application forms, etc.
29 C.F.R. § 1607.2 (1977). Thus, for validation purposes under the EEOC Guidelines, the term
"test" translates in effect into "criterion," making the Guidelines particularly instructive in the
handicap area. But see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 n.8 (1971).
64. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1977). In addition to the EEOC Guidelines on validation, a
second set of employee selection guidelines known as the Federal Executive Agency Employee
Selection Guidelines ("FEA Guidelines") has emerged under the auspices of the United States
Department of Justice, Department of Labor and Civil Service Commission. 28 C.F.R. § 50.14
(1977) (Department of Justice); 41 C.F.R. § 60-3 (1977) (Department of Labor); 41 Fed. Reg.
51752 (1976) to be published in the Federal Personnel Manual Supplements (Civil Service
Commission).
The EEOC has specifically refused to adopt the FEA Guidelines. 41 Fed. Reg. 51984 (1976).
Thus, in light of the "great deference" given the EEOC Guidelines by Griggs and Moody, the
FEA Guidelines are of limited applicability in Title VII cases. Nonetheless, the FEA Guidelines
do affect the agencies which adopted them. The Department of Justice has enforcement author-
ity tinder Title VII § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp. V 1975), in cases against state and
local governmental agencies, and thus may be expected to argue for the FEA Guidelines in
such cases. The Civil Service Commission has the power to enforce Title VII in cases involving
federal agencies at the administrative level, Title VII § 717 (b), 42 U.S.Cs § 2000e-16 (b) (Supp.
V 1975). The Department of Labor has no authority under Title VII but will use the FEA
Guidelines in enforcement of Executive Order No. 11246 as amended by Executive Order No.
11375, 41 Fed. Reg. 51986 (1976), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, national
origin, religion or sex by federal contractors and mandates affirmative action to insure equal
employment opportunity.
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have failed to satisfy a particular requirement (or test) at a dispropor-
tionately higher rate than non-minority applicants. 65 The courts have
generally looked for "statistically significant" differences in impact, 66
without requiring any specific percentage difference or level of statis-
tical significance. 6
7
In cases where statistics on actual pass-fail rates have not been
available, or have not been sufficiently reliable (e.g., due to the small
size of the sample), courts have relied upon the results of a particular
test in another context, expert testimony, and census statistics dem-
onstrating a disparity between the employer's work force and the
general population of the community as an indication of disparate ef-
fect of a selection device. 68 This approach is of particular significance
in the handicap context, since the sample of handicapped applicants
for a specific job is likely to be small, 69 and the handicapped are a
particularly insular minority that has not yet been the subject of ex-
tensive statistical analyses.
Under both EEOC Guidelines and case law, once a prima facie
case has been established by demonstrating the discriminatory impact
65. See, e.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 427-28 (7th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 912 n.5 (5th Cir. 1973).
66. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
67. However, the FEA Guidelines, § 4, 41 Fed. Reg. 51737 (1976), generally regard a
selection for a racial, ethnic or sex group which is less than 80% of the rate for the group with
the highest rate as evidence of adverse impact.
68. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977); Rogers v. International Paper Co.,
510 F. 2d 1340, 1348-49 (8th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded for reconsideration of relief, 4.23
U.S. 809 (1975); Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 516 F.2d 103, 115-16 (5th Cir. 1975);
League of Latin American Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873, 902 (C.D. Cal.
1976).
69. The promulgators of the HEW regulations under the Rehabilitation Act recognized the
problems inherent in applying the Title VII prima facie case standards in the handicap area:
Tests and selection criteria. Revised § 84.13(a) prohibits employers from using
test or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out handicapped
persons unless the test or criterion is shown to be job-related and alternative tests
or criteria that do not screen out or tend to screen out as many handicapped per-
sons are not shown by the Director to be available. This paragraph is an application
of the principle established under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Under the proposed section, a statistical showing of adverse impact on handi-
capped persons was required to trigger an employer's obligation to show that
employment criteria and qualifications relating to handicap were necessary. This re-
quirement was changed because the small number of handicapped persons taking
tests would make statistical showings of "disproportionate, adverse effect" difficult
and burdensome. Under the altered, more workable provision, once it is shown that
an employment test substantially limits the opportunities of handicapped persons,
the employer must show the test to be job-related.
Appendix A to Proposed HEW Regulations, 42 Fed. Reg. 22688-89 (1977).
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of a selection device, the burden shifts to the user of the device to
rebut the inference of discrimination by introducing evidence of vali-
dation.70 The EEOC Guidelines allow the use of three methods of
validation, criterion-related, content and construct, 71 and deal with
them in order of preference. 72  Whichever validation technique is
used, a professional inquiry is made into the selection device in order
to determine whether application of that device predicts job perfor-
mance. 7
3
70. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). The FEA Guidelines, § 3 (b)
(i) and (ii), 41 Fed. Reg. 51736 (1976), exempt formal and informal tests from technical valida-
tion where such validation is "not feasible or not appropriate." Instead, under such cir-
cumstances a test must be modified to "minimize or eliminate adverse impact . . . or otherwise
justify the continued use of the procedure or alternatively, its continued use in accord with
Federal law." Of course, if the applicable federal law is Title VII, validation would be required.
71. 29 C.F.R § 1607.5(a) (1977).
72. The first and clearly preferred form of validation (by the EEOC Guidelines) is criterion-
related validity, which indicates the effectiveness of a test in predicting job performance. Vari-
ous criteria which measure job performance are identified. Test scores are then matched with
job performance ratings for the selected criteria. If the performance ratings and test scores
correlate, the test is said to have criterion-related validity, which is especially essential in val-
idating entry-level aptitude tests.
The second method of validation is content validity. A test which has content validity mea-
sures actual job knowledge or proficiency, e.g., a typing test for a stenographer's job. Content
validation is useful for determining the validity of achievement tests.
The third method of validation is construct validity. A test which has construct validity mea-
sures the degree to which a job applicant possesses characteristics or traits, such as intelligence,
mechanical comprehension, and verbal fluency, which are believed to be important to successful
job performance.
Neither content nor construct validity are preferred forms of validation under the EEOC
Guidelines and may be relied upon only where criterion-related validity is not feasible. 29
C.F.R. § 1607.5(a) (1977). In preferring criterion validation over content and construct valida-
tion, the EEOC Guidelines incorporate and adopt the position of the American Psychological
Association as enunciated in its "Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests and Manu-
als." By contrast, the FEA Guidelines, although recognizing the three types of validation, con-
tain no explicit preference.
73. The different forms of test validation take one into the murky realm of psychology.
Detailed discussion of each validation method is not within the ambitions of this article, which
posits that a more rational approach to determining job-relatedness is required than is now in
use. For a more technical and complete treatment of this subject, the reader is advised to begin
with A. ANASTASI. PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING (New York, 1976) and L.J. CRONBACH, ESSEN-
TIALS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING (New York, 1970).
The Title VII experience has been that the Courts too have sought a pragmatic rather than
technical approach to the application of the EEOC Guidelines. As one court has noted,
We do not read Griggs as requiring compliance by every employer with each
technical form of validation procedure set out in 29 C.F.R., part 1607. Neverthe-
less, these guidelines undeniably provide a valid framework for determining
whether a validation study manifests that a particular test predicts reasonable job
suitability. Their guidance value is such that we hold they should be followed ab-
sent a showing that some cogent reason exists for noncompliance.
United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 913 (5th Cir. 1973).
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Within this framework, a number of Title VII cases have been de-
cided involving the use of physical criteria, in the form of height and
weight requirements, that disproportionately exclude women and
members of certain nationality groups. 74  In Dothard v. Rawlinson, 7
the female plaintiff's application for a job as a correction counselor
(prison guard) in the Alabama state penitentiary system was rejected
because she did 'not meet the minimum 120 pound weight require-
ment established by Alabama law. 76 The applicant challenged the
height and weight requirements as violative of Title VII. 77  After de-
termining that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case, 71 the
The HEW Regulations to the Rehabilitation Act likewise anticipate some flexibility in valida-
tion and showing job-relatedness:
A recipient is no longer limited to using predictive validity studies as the method
for demonstrating that a test or other selection criterion is in fact job-related. Nor,
in all cases, are predictive validity studies sufficient to demonstrate that a test or
criterion is job-related. In addition, § 84.13(a) has been revised to place the burden
on the Director, rather than the recipient, to identify alternate tests.
Appendix A to proposed HEW Regulations, 42 Fed. Reg. 22689 (1977).
74. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (height and weight requirement
for state police and corrections officers invalidated); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d
1334 (9th Cir. 1977) (fire department height requirement struck); Officers for Justice v. Civil
Service Commission of San Francisco, 395 F.Supp. 378 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (municipal police
height and agility requirements struck); League of United Latin American Citizens v. City of
Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (municipal police and fire department height rules
barred); Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976) (police
height requirement sustained as constitutional; weight requirement found unconstitutional; no
Title VII claim presented); Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 62 F.R.D. 98 (W.D. Ky. 1973), aff'd
in part and remanded on other grounds, 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
998 (1976) (weight requirement for production jobs found unlawful); United States v. Lee Way
Motor Freight, Inc., 7 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6461 (W.D. Okla. 1973) (height and weight require-
ments for road driver positions, while reasonable, were applied in a discriminatory fashion);
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969) (lifting requirement imposed only
on women unlawful); Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1974) (females may not be automati-
cally disqualified as warehousemen because the job requires physical strength). Cf. Gerdom v.
Continental Air Lines, Inc., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1205 (D.C. Cal. 1976) (weight and per-
sonal appearance standards applied to both male and female employees with equal impact were
upheld). But see Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1061 (E.D. Mo. 1976) and Jarrell
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Va. 1977).
75. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
76. 433 U.S. at 323-24. The statute also required that the applicant be at least 5 feet 2
inches tall. Id.
77. The plaintiff in Dothard also challenged a regulation which established express gender
based criteria for assigning guards to "contact" positions in maximum security institutions. 433
U.S. at 325-26. See also text accompanying notes 75-81 infra.
78. 433 U.S. at 329-31. The defendants had argued that a prima facie case was not made out
because the plaintiffs had used national statistics on the height and weight of women and not
statistics adduced from actual applicants for correctional facility positions. The Court rejected
this argument, 433 U.S. at 330, noting that many applicants might have been deterred from
applying by knowledge of the requirements, see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 365-68 (1977), and that there was no reason to believe that national
statistics would vary greatly from those in Alabama.
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Court turned to whether the defendants had effectively rebutted it.
As justification for the challenged requirements, the defendents of-
fered no study, professional or otherwise. Instead, the height and
weight criteria were said to "have a relationship to strength, a suffi-
cient but unspecified amount of which is essential to effective job
performance as a correctional counselor." 79 The Court flatly rejected
this attempt to justify discriminatory criteria without compliance with
Griggs:
If the job-related quality that the appellants identify is bona fide,
their purpose could be achieved by adopting and validating a test
for applicants that measures strength directly. Such a test, fairly
administered, would fully satisfy the standards of Title VII because
it would be one that "measure[s] the person for the job and not the
person in the abstract." Griggs v. Duke Power Co_ .. But noth-
ing in the present record even approaches such a measurement.8 0
In dealing with physical criteria that discriminate on the basis of sex,
then, Title VII requires the same strict showing of job-relatedness
that comes into play when rlacially discriminatory criteria are
utilized. 81
In the Title VII cases, the physical criteria challenged are always
related in some way to prohibited discrimination based upon race, sex
or national origin. If the Title VII analysis is applied to the handi-
capped cases, a similar link must also' be shown by the aggrieved
party. The physical criteria challenged must be shown to relate in
some way to prohibited discrimination against the handicapped. That
accomplished, the burden then shifts to the employer to show that
the challenged criteria are job-related.
Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications
Under Title VII, the exclusion of persons from employment based
expressly upon religion, sex or national origin is permitted only if the
employer can show that religion, sex or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification for the job in question.8 2 Three obvious
examples of BFOQ's are the requirements that an actor be a man, an
actress be a woman, or that a wet nurse be a woman.8 3  Unfortu-
79. 433 U.S. at 331.
80. Id. at 332. In a footnote, the Court cited the EEOC Guidelines. Id. n.15.
81. Prior to Dothard, some defendants had argued that Griggs was applicable only to cases
involving racial discrimination. See, e.g., Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496 (7th
Cir. 1977). Such an argument ran against the great weight of contrary lower court authority that
had accumulated prior to Dothard and is now, of course, laid to rest by Dothard.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970).
83. See Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1971).
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nately, the BFOQ's that have been the subject of litigation have not
been quite so obvious.
It is now well settled that, at least in the context of sex discrimina-
tion, the BFOQ qualification is to be narrowly construed. As the Su-
preme Court noted in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 84
We are persuaded by the restrictive language of §703(e), the rel-
evant legislative history, and the consistent interpretation of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission-that the BFOQ ex-
ception was in fact meant to be an extremely narrow exception to
the general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex. 85
In practice, the exception has operated only when physical features of
one sex are essential to performance of the job, 0l when sex authen-
ticity is required, 87 or when the interests of decency or privacy are
involved. 8
The BFOQ defense is not available when the exclusion is based
upon traits or characteristics, such as strength, that are non-sexual
but nonetheless identified more strongly with one sex than
84. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
85. Id. at 334 (footnotes omitted). The Court's conclusion was supported by the EEOC's
interpretation of the statute, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1977), as well as the case law that had
developed in the lower courts. Gillin v. Federal Paper Bd. Co., 479 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1973);
Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co., 477 F.2d 1038 (3d Cir. 1973); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac.
Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir.
1969); Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 62 F.R.D. 98 (W.D. Ky. 1973), modified on other
grounds, 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975). Additionally, the Court cited, with apparent approval,
language from Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971) ("dis-
crimination based on sex is valid only when the essence of the business occupation would be
undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively") 433 U.S. at 333 (emphasis supplied
by the Court of Appeals).
86. The wet nurse is the primary example. See Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d
1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1971). This standard also seems to be the basis for the Supreme Court's
decision on the BFOQ issue in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). See text accompany-
ing notes 84-98 infra.
87. See Button v. Rockefeller, 76 Misc. 2d 701, 351 N.Y.S. 2d 488, 490 (Sup. Ct. 1973)
(holding that sex was a BFOQ for female state troopers for search of female prisoners and for
undercover work); and EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (2) (1977) ("Where it is neces-
sary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness, the Commission will consider sex to be a
bona fide occupational qualification, e.g., an actor or actress.").
88. The applicable EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1977), do not expressly recognize
"decency" or "privacy" as a BFOQ, but other administrative agencies, as well as arbitrators,
have. See e.g., N.Y. Guidelines for Applying Sex Discrimination Law, .§ D(1) (b), EMPL. PRAC.
GUIDE (CCH) 29,053; C6rn Products Co. Int'l Inc. v. Atomic Workers Local 7-662, 70-1 Lab.
Arb. 8432 (1970) (Gross, Arb.)
Under Title VII, when the potential for infringements upon privacy has been slight, the
BFOQ has not attached. See e.g., Wilson v. Sibley Memorial Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 686 (D.D.C.
1972), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Refusal to hire
male nurse to treat female patients states claim under Title VII).
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another.8 9 Such stereotypical assumptions, if not proven in fact,
have been invalidated. 90 Thus, if the narrow construction given the
gender exception by the courts under Title VII is applied to the
handicap cases, alleged BFOQ's based upon stereotypical assumptions
of what the handicapped can and cannot do should fail as defenses. 91
The Supreme Court spoke to the merits of the BFOQ defense as-
serted in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 92 in which the Alabama Board of
Corrections excluded all women from serving as prison guards in
"contact" positions in all-male penitentiaries. 93  Although agreeing
that the BFOQ exception should be narrowly construed, 94 the Court
concluded that in the "particular factual circumstances of this case,"
sex was indeed a BFOQ. 95 These circumstances included a pecu-
liarly inhospitable environment in the male prisons in which twenty
percent of the inmates were estimated to be sex offenders.9 6  The
Court credited expert testimony that women in contact positions
89. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971); Weeks v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Cheatwood v. South Cent. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 303 F. Supp. 754
(M.D. Ala. 1969).
90. For example, in Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969), the
employer prohibited all female employees from working in jobs which required lifting weights
over 35 pounds. The court found that this prohibition violated Title VII, and noted:
If anything is certain in this controversial area, it is that there is no general
agreement as to what is a maximum permissible weight which can be safely lifted
by women in the course of their employment.
Id. at 717. The court went on to hold that although Colgate could retain the lifting requirement
"as a general guideline for all of its employees, male and female," id. at 718, it had to allow
each employee to demonstrate his or her ability to satisfy the requirement. The court (lid not
inquire into the validity of the weight lifting requirement or question its job-relatedness.
91. A harbinger of such a narrow interpretation of the BFOQ exception in the handicap
context is found in Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977), in which the court
refused to indulge in the school district's assumption that blind teachers were not competent to
teach sighted students. See text accompanying notes 37-40 supra.
92. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
93. Men were likewise excluded from contact positions in all female institutions. 433 U.S. at
325 n.6, 332-33 n. 16. However, the regulation excluded women from 75% of available jobs. 433
U.S. at 333 n.16.
94. 433 U.S. at 334.
95. Id.
96. 433 U.S. at 335, citing Weeks v. Sfuthern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 232-36
(5th Cir. 1969). The Court noted that, normally, whether or not to take a job that may be uncom-
fortable or dangerous is a question to be decided by the job applicant. Bowe v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 717-18 (7th Cir. 1969); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d
1219 (9th Cir. 1971). However, here the Court concluded that the woman's ability to maintain
security would be directly affected by her womanhood and the work environment hostile to it.
433 U.S. at 335.
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would pose substantial security problems directly related to their
sex.
97
By basing the BFOQ in large part upon the nature of the inmate
population and noting the "particular factual circumstances" of the
case, the Court seems to have limited the holding to its facts, as the
dissent does note. 98 Nonetheless Dothard does underscore two im-
portant, and somewhat contradictory, points about the BFOQ excep-
tion. First, it is to be read narrowly. And second, unlike job-
relatedness, the existence of a BFOQ is determined more by the
individual notions of the judges deciding the issue than by professional
validation. Thus, although the BFOQ is a rarely used sword, when it
is used it is difficult to predict how it will cut.
USE OF TITLE VII STANDARDS
IN HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION CASES.
Job -Relatedness
Applying Title VII standards in determining job-relatedness to
handicap cases is not without its problems. It is obvious that the Title
VII experience does not lend itself to a wholesale application.
Nonetheless, selective application of sufficiently analagous Title VII
principles may prove fruitful.
One Title VII principle that is not readily transferable is the prima
facie case. Proof of such a case of discrimination is generally made out
under Title VII by showing a statisically significant disparity between
the rates at which various groups satisfy selection criteria. 99 How-
ever, in the handicap cases, the number of handicapped applicants
may not be a large enough base for a traditional statistical study. 100
Even though alternative approaches are available under Title VII, 101
such as the use of national statistics, rather than specific applicant
97. Id. at 336. Mr. Justices Marshall and Brennan joined in strong dissent from this part of
the majority opinion, Id. at 340-47, noting, "It appears that the real disqualifying factor in the
Court's view is '[tihe employee's very womanhood"' Id. at 345 (citation omitted). The dissenters
saw danger that the majority opinion might continue the "'romancic paternalism' and persisting
discriminatory attitude that the Court properly eschews." Id. at 345-46. The dissent concluded
by noting that the majority opinion may well be limited to the particular factual circumstances
of the case, i.e., "the shockingly inhuman conditions in Alabama prisons." Id. at 347.
98. Compare 433 U.S. at 346-47 with 433 U.S. at 334.
99. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). See notes 65-69 and accom-
panying text supra.
100. This problem was recognized by the promulgators of the HEW Regulations under the
Rehabilitation Act. See note 69 supra.
101. See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
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figures, 102 the better approach seems to be that offered by the HEW
Regulations under the Rehabilitation Act. The Regulations require a
showing of job-relatedness as to any "selection criterion that screens
out or tends to screen out handicapped persons or any class of hand-
icapped persons." 103 By contrast, the Title VII doctrine that shifts
the burden to the employer to show job-relatedness once a prima
facie case is made is readily applicable to handicap cases. In fact, the
majority of the handicap cases decided to date have applied this prin-
ciple.
It is in the gray area of validation itself that application of Title VII
standards becomes difficult. Although the burden of showing job-
relatedness may be placed upon the employer, the extent of that
burden is not so easily delineated. In many instances the criterion-
related validity study favored by the EEOC Guidelines will be im-
practical, if not impossible, to apply to the handicap context due to a
lack of a significant number of handicapped test takers in the sample.
The HEW Regulations recognize this problem, and accordingly
neither require predictive criterion validation nor endorse it as a legal
defense to a claim of discrimination.10 4
Alternative related solutions to the validation problem are avail-
able, however. One is found in the FEA Guidelines, 105 which pro-
vide that where technical validation is not feasible or appropriate a
test must be modified to minimize its discriminatory impact. 10 6  In
the handicap context, such modification would take two forms. The
first is obvious, and relates to the way the test is administered. For
example, if an applicant is blind, the questions would have to be
given orally or in braille. 10 7 The second such modification would
102. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
103. 45 C.F.R. § 84.13(a) (1977) (emphasis added). The promulgators of the HEW Regula-
tions noted that under this provision, "once it is shown that an employment test substantially
limits the opportunities of handicapped persons, the employer must show the test to be job-
related." 42 Fed. Reg. 22689 (1977). This subjective approach obviously lacks the precision of a
more complex statistical analysis, but in the handicap context it is probably the only workable
procedure.
104. Comments following the HEW Regulations note,
A recipient is no longer limited to using predictive validity studies as the method
for demonstrating that a test or other selection criterion is in fact job-related. Nor,
in all cases, are predictive validity studies sufficient to demonstrate that a test or
criterion is job-related.
Appendix A to proposed HEW Regulations, 42 Fed. Reg. 22689 (1977).
105. See note 64 supra.
106. Section 3 (b)(i) and (ii), 41 Fed. Reg. 51752-53 (1976).
107. The HEW Regulations also require this type of modification:
A recipient shall select and administer tests concerning employment so as best to
ensure that, when administered to an applicant or employee who has a handicap
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involve weighting the handicapped applicant's performance on those
aspects of the test that he is able to satisfy without regard to his
handicap, and correspondingly reducing the adverse weight accorded
his failure to satisfy those test components that are related to his
handicap (but not necessarily to the job). As an example, consider a
person with hand prostheses who applies for a job as a road mender,
and assume that the employer requires that he be able to operate a
road grader and have the appropriate driver's license, both of which
requirements he satisfies, and also that the employer requires that he
be able to lift 75 pounds, when the applicant can in fact only lift 50.
In the absence of a clearcut showing by the employer of job-
relatedness of the lifting requirement, the handicapped applicant's
satisfaction of the license and experience requirements would be
given extra weight to offset his ability to satisfy only two-thirds of the
lifting requirement. In cases in which the above modification proce-
dure would be impractical, on the job trial periods might be substi-
tuted for handicapped applicants who satisfy all job requirements ex-
cept those related to their handicaps.
Of course, even in the handicap context, professional validation
may often be possible, and in fact may be the best way to determine
job-relatedness. Such situations include those cases in which the chal-
lenged criteria exclude not only handicapped applicants, but also
broader categories, such as women. Lifting and other strength re-
quirements are examples. 10  In such cases a showing of job-
relatedness 109 would probably exonerate an employer from charges of
sex-discrimination, and possibly from those of handicap discrimination
as well. (Of course, a handicapped applicant might still prevail, if,
with reasonable employer accomodation, he could substantially per-
form the job. 110) Conversely, a failure to show such criteria to be
job-related would invalidate them for use in excluding handicapped as
well as female applicants.
that impairs sensory, manual, or speaking skills, the test results accurately reflect
the applicant's or employee's job skills, aptitude, or whatever other factor the test
purports to measure, rather than reflecting the applicant's or employee's impaired
sensory, manual, or speaking skills (except where those skills are the factors that the
test purports to measure).
45 C.F.R. § 84.13(b) (1977).
108. See cases cited in note 74 supra.
109. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).
110. See note 117 infra.
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Although Title VII standards of job-relatedness cannot be the sine
qua non for compliance with law in the handicap field, they do pro-
vide a good point of reference from which the courts may proceed to
determine the legality of criteria that exclude the handicapped from
employment. As the case law develops, more precise principles
applicable to the handicapped probably will be produced. These
probably will be hybrids of the Title VII standards and the standards
that have evolved in the due process and equal protection cases.
Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications
As indicated, the BFOQ exception under Title VII is a narrow
one, "I limited to cases in which a particular sex, religion or national
origin is actually part and parcel of the job in question. 1 2  There
may be some doubt that the enactors of handicap discrimination legis-
lation intended the BFOQ exception to be read so narrowly.
Nonetheless, a narrow reading of the exception is in order.
Remedial legislation, such as that prohibiting employment dis-
crimination, is always to be read broadly, with an eye toward protect-
ing the individuals that the particular statute seeks to protect. 113
Conversely, exceptions to such legislation are to be read narrowly.
Thus, in the context of sex discrimination, the courts have read Title
VII to prohibit any classification based upon sex, religion or national
origin unless those attributes are essential to the performance of the
job. The handicapped person is similarly situated to those protected
by Title VII; his rights are subject to infringement because of charac-
teristics determined by means outside of his control. In such in-
stances, exclusion can only be justified by weighty considerations, and
only narrow exceptions are in order.' 14
111. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
112. See notes 82-98 and accompanying text supra.
113. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co.
444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971); Wilson v. Sibley Memorial Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 686 (D.D.C.
1972), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Button v. Rock-
efeller, 76 Misc. 2d 701, 351 N.Y.S. 2d 488 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
114. Such has been the case in the equal protection cases. As the Supreme Court noted in
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973),
Moreover, since sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic
determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities
upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate
"the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some reasonable
relationship to individual responsibility. ... Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety




Still a problem, however, is the delineation of the BFOQ exception
even after it has been narrowed. This problem is manifested in
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 115 in which the Supreme Court acknowledged
the limited scope of the exception, but allowed its application
nonetheless. In Dothard, the Court was guided by what many, in-
cluding the dissent, consider to be stereotypical and paternalistic at-
titudes towards women. 1 16 The same danger exists in applying the
BFOQ standard to the handicap cases.
The Courts and the litigants, therefore, would be well advised to
consider in each case what the handicapped worker can do before
determining that lack of a particular handicap is a bona fide qualifica-
tion for the job. Complex studies of job-relatedness and validity
should not be necessary in the BFOQ context, since the narrowness
of the exception places a burden on the employer to clearly prove
that the handicap should be exclusionary. This does not, however,
eliminate the Court's obligation to examine empirically the facts of
the case-the job on the one hand, and the applicant's handicap on
the other-in order to determine whether the exception is appro-
priate.
Finally, given the limited scope of the exception, in close cases the
balance should be struck in favor of the handicapped worker. Any
competing interest on the part of the employer might be served, in
such close cases, by a probationary period during which competence
can be shown. 117
CONCLUSION
The handicap cases should develop a specialized and unique ap-
proach to the issues of job-relatedness of employment selection
criteria and bona fide occupational qualifications. Although the Title
VII approach, with respect to these issues, is not applicable wholesale
to the emerging body of employment discrimination law involving the
handicapped, many of the principles developed under Title VII are
applicable. The Title VII experience as a whole is highly instruc-
tive. Accordingly, the courts and the litigants in handicap cases are
well advised to look to Title VII and its cases as a starting point when
confronted with job-relatedness and BFOQ issues.
115. See notes 92-98 and accompanying text supra.
116. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. at 345-46.
117. In appropriate cases, such as those under the coverage of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
accommodation during this period and after would be required.
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It can be expected that the emerging approach in the handicap
cases will show a reliance upon Title VII doctrines for establishing
basic principles. Such a reliance would indicate judicial sensitivity for
the specific problems of the handicapped who, like other minorities,
seek a fair opportunity to show their qualifications for employment
and a desire to be judged by standards that accurately reflect those
qualifications.
